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ARGUMENT 
I. THE RECORD ON APPEAL SHOULD BE AUGMENTED PURSUANT TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT. 
Plaintiff argues that the Court may not consider Defendants' argument relative to the 
documents attached as Appendix C to Defendants' opening brief, arguing that these documents 
are not part of the record. 
While Plaintiff is correct that these documents were not included in the Clerks Record on 
Appeal, these documents are contained in the trial court record. And whether these documents 
should be augmented into the record on appeal has been addressed and resolved by Defendants 
in their Motion to Augment that is filed contemporaneously herewith. 
As demonstrated in that motion, the documents attached at Appendix C include the Utah 
Complaint and the Guaranty signed by Defendants. These documents were made part of the trial 
court record on July 11,2012, and were referred to by counsel at oral argument on the motion for 
reconsideration. See Augmentation Document, containing file-stamp of trial court, and filed 
with Defendants' Motion to Augment. The documents were therefore part of the record below, 
and this Court may consider them in deciding this appeal. 
Plaintiff does not want the Court to consider the documents at Appendix C because they 
dispose of, in Defendants' favor, the issue of whether Plaintiff should be compelled to file a full 
satisfaction of judgment in this case. Plaintiff is bound by the default judgment in the Utah case, 
in which the Utah court granted default on the allegations in the Utah Complaint, including the 
allegation at paragraph 19 of the Utah Complaint, which reads that "[a]ny judgment obtained 
prior to the property being foreclosed should be offset by the amount received by the Plaintiff at 
the foreclosure sale." 
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Appellee is also bound by the Guaranty, which states that the Guaranty "shall be effective 
and remain in full force and effect until all Obligations are paid and performed in full. ... " See 
App. C, p. 20,' 5(a). 
II. WHILE THE ABSENCE OF NEW EVIDENCE, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, A TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD NOT GRANT A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITHOUT 
SOME LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS FOR DOING SO. 
Plaintiff argues that new evidence need not be presented to support a motion for 
reconsideration. See Plaintiffs Brief, at 5-6 (citing, inter alia, Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 
468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
In Lambros, the Court reviewed this Court's earlier jurisprudence on motions for 
reconsideration, and summarized the case law interpreting challenges to motions for 
reconsideration. In its summary, this Court stated that Idaho jurisprudence on motions for 
reconsideration stand for the proposition that "if a trial court's conclusions were correct on the 
previous record, and it does not thereafter receive any information that would change its 
previous ruling, there is no basis for it to overturn its initial decision." Lambros, 143 Idaho at 
473, 147 P.3d at 105 (citing Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 908 (2001)) (emphasis 
added). The Court then held that "the absence of new evidence accompanying [a] ... motion for 
reconsideration d[ oes] not, standing alone, require that the motion be denied." Id., at 473 
(emphasis added). In other words, if the only challenge to the motion for reconsideration is a 
lack of new evidence, such challenge will not prevail. To prevail, the challenge needs to show a 
lack of evidence and lack of other legal bases for overturning the earlier decision, i.e., lack of 
evidence, plus. 
Here, Defendants challenge the trial court's granting the motion for reconsideration 
because there was no basis, factual or legal, to overturn its November 8,2012 decision. It was 
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not only the lack of new evidence that failed to support the trial court's decision on 
reconsideration, it was also a lack of any legal basis to support such a decision. 
The trial court's decision was based on the premise that Defendants, through seeking an 
order compelling the filing of a satisfaction of judgment, are challenging the underlying merits 
and the amount of the Utah judgment. This premise was erroneously based on Wooster v. 
Wooster, 399 N.W.2d 330 (S. D. 1987), which stated that "[n]o defense may be set up which 
goes to the merits of the original controversy, or which might have been interposed in the 
original action." See App. B to Appellants' Opening Brief, at 5 n.12. As argued in its opening 
brief, by seeking an order compelling Plaintiff to file a full satisfaction of judgment, Defendants 
are not defending against the underlying merits of the Utah action. 
III. RES JUDICATA DOES NOT PREVENT A JUDGMENT DEBTOR FROM 
CHALLENGING POST -JUDGMENT COLLECTION EFFORTS. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants' requested relief that would require Plaintiff to file a full 
satisfaction of judgment is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff is wrong. 
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, "bars a subsequent action between the same parties 
upon the same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action ... which might have 
been made." See Ticor Title v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007). To bar a 
subsequent action, three requirements must be met: (1) same parties, (2) same claim, and (3) 
final judgment. See id., at 124,157 P.3d at 618. 
In this case, the first and third elements of res judicata are arguably satisfied, since the 
parties in the Idaho action are the same parties in the Utah action. Also, the Utah court entered a 
final judgment. However, the second element is missing. The claims at issue in the Utah action 
were (1) whether Defendants defaulted on the $300,000 loan with Plaintiff, and (2) whether there 
was fraud involved in the underlying loan transaction. Defendants chose not to appear in the 
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Utah action, and therefore a default judgment was taken. Such judgment was entered on the 
basis of the claims asserted in the Utah complaint, including the "offset" allegation in paragraph 
19 of the Utah complaint. 
None of these claims are at issue in the Idaho judgment collection proceedings. To 
collect on its default judgment, Plaintiff foreclosed on the Idaho property. After foreclosing on 
the Idaho property, Plaintiff continued in its judgment collection efforts by, inter alia, seeking 
and obtaining a charging order against any corporate interests the judgment debtors had. 
Defendants' action in seeking an order compelling Plaintiff to file a full satisfaction of judgment 
is not a claim or defense to the underlying Utah action. Quite to the contrary, Defendants' action 
in seeking a full satisfaction of judgment could not have been raised in the Utah action unless 
and until a judgment had been entered. Now that a domesticated judgment has been entered and 
collection proceedings commenced, Defendants should be allowed to challenge whether the 
judgment has been fully satisfied by virtue of the foreclosure. This is entirely consistent with 
Plaintiffs allegation in the Utah complaint that any judgment obtained prior to the foreclosure 
"should be offset by the amount received by the Plaintiff at the foreclosure sale," and consistent 
with the Guaranty, which is effective until the underlying liability is fully satisfied. See App. C. 
This case is not analogous to Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. v. Red Arrow Marina Sales & 
Service, Inc., 224 P.3d 685 (Okla. 2009). The issue of first impression in Red Arrow was 
whether a creditor, who does not impose liability on a mortgage debtor for the deficiency that 
remains after a foreclosure sale, may maintain a suit against the debtor and other parties for fraud 
in the inducement of the loan that is secured by mortgage. See id., at 689. Stated another way, 
the issue in Red Arrow was whether the mortgage debt's satisfaction under Oklahoma's anti-
deficiency statute closes for a defrauded lender all other legal avenues of recovery. In holding 
4 
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that it does not, the court stated that Oklahoma's anti-deficiency statute does not provide 
absolute protection to mortgage debtors, and will only provide relief from liability on the 
underlying debt, not from answering in damages for fraudulent acts in the mortgage transaction. 
See id. 
Red Arrow was an anti-deficiency statute case. This case is not. In Red Arrow, the 
creditor at issue apparently only had a foreclosure judgment allowing the creditor to foreclose on 
the property, and no judgment for money damages for the deficiency or for damages related to 
fraud. In this case, the judgment that was entered by the Utah court was for all damages, 
including damages related to the underlying debt and to the claim for fraud. Therefore, the 
judgment in this case is much different than the judgment in Red Arrow, making that case 
inapplicable here. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in Defendants' opening brief, the 
Court should reverse the trial court's May 31, 2013 decision, and remand to the trial court for 
trial on the issue of the property's fair market value on the date of foreclosure. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 2014. 
KIRTON McCONI(IE-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~daY of February, 2014, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF was mailed in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, 
and faxed, to the following: 
Jack H. Robison 
JONES, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 9671203 S. Garfield 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0967 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Facsimile: (208) 232-5962 
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